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The money market deposit account (MMDA) is the first liquid,
short-term, small denomination deposit account in recent history to
be free from interest-rate ceilings. Introduced in December 1982, it
has become a very important source ofdeposits, with balances cur-
rently over the $450 billion level nationally, which represents about
15 percent of total deposits. In this paper, we analyze why the
account has been so successful, where the funds in the account came
from, how the shift in funds affected banks' deposit costs and how
individual banks competed for and priced MMDAs.
The single most important step in the dereg-
ulation of interest rates on retail deposits at
banks and thrifts was the authorization of the
money market deposit account (MMDA) and
the Super-NOW account, which were both free
of interest ceilings. 1 The volume of funds that
moved into MMDAs was staggering: MMDAs
grew to over $300 billion (15 percent of total
deposits) within three months after their intro-
duction on December 14,1982. Super-NOWac-
counts, however, attracted only some $30 bil-
lion during the three-month period after their
introduction on January 5, 1983.
In this paper, we analyze why and how the
MMDA so dramatically altered both deposi-
tors' and banks' holdings of deposits and the
nature of competition for deposits. Our objec-
tives are to explain why these accounts were so
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popular, where the funds came from, what de-
termined individual banks' pattern of adoption
of these accounts, and how sensitive the quan-
tity of funds in these accounts was to variations
in both their own interest rate as well as the
rate on substitute assets. Our analysis focuses
on the MMDA rather than the Super-NOW be-
cause the MMDA's impact on deposit holdings
was so much larger.
Money market deposit accounts are an in-
sured, short-term, ceiling-free account with
limited transaction features that were, in the
language of the authorizing Garn-St Germain
Act of 1982, to be "... directly equivalent to
and competitive with money market mutual
funds...". However, prior to their introduc-
tion, there was considerable uncertainty about
the sources and stability of MMDA deposits
and how they would be priced. Some thought
that MMDAs would attract large quantities of
money from the money funds, and there even
was speculation about the long-term viability of
the money funds given that MMDAs were in-
sured. Others thought that most MMDA de-
posits would come from other funds already on
deposit at banks and thrifts. If large amountsof low-interest "core" deposits like passbook
savings accounts were transferred into
MMDAs, there were fears that banks' and
thrifts' deposit costs would rise substantially.
There was also uncertainty about how quickly
funds would be attracted to MMDAs and
whether they would be responsive to minor rate
changes (as are large, $100,000 and over, Cer-
tificates of Deposit, CDs), allowing individual
institutions to increase their market shares by
slightly outbidding their competitors. More-
over, it was unclear whether the MMDA's rate-
sensitivity would change over time-with bal-
ances more rate-sensitive during the initial in-
troductory period than once depositors had
shifted funds into the new accounts.
We address these issues by analyzing the
competition for MMDAs, both among banks as
well as between banks and the money funds.
Our empirical analysis of these issues utilizes
monthly data on the rates and quantities of de-
posits ofMMDAs and other accounts for a sam-
ple of 59 banks in the 12th Federal Reserve
District. (See Data Appendix.) Data for indi-
vidual banks, unlike aggregate data, enable us
to address questions of interbank competition,
which most previous studies of deposit flows
cannot.2 We do, however, use nationwide ag-
gregate data to estimate the flows offunds into
MMDAs from the money funds and from other
deposit accounts.
Our analysis uses both micro and macro data
to estimate the parameters of the supply func-
tion of MMDA deposits to banks. Both short-
and long-run, own- and cross-price elasticities
are estimated. In addition, we analyze the pro-
cess of adjustment in financial markets both to
the introduction of a new account and to
changes in rates once the initial adjustment is
complete.
The organization ofthe remainder of this pa-
per is as follows. In Section I, we provide a brief
description of the MMDA account and a his-
torical perspective on why it was introduced.
Aggregate data for the nation are used to mea-
sure flows of funds into MMDAs, both from
the money market funds and from funds al-
ready on deposit with banks and thrifts. Section
II outlines a theory of banks' demand for
MMDA deposits and the nature of deposit ad-
justment costs. Implications of this theory for
the market acceptance and pricing of MMDAs
are developed as well. In Section III, the com-
petition for MMDAs is analyzed. First, the time
pattern of adoption of MMDAs is modeled as
a function of banks' characteristics and pricing
strategies. Then, estimates of the short- and
long-run, own- and cross-interest elasticities of
the supply of deposits to banks are presented.
Section IV presents our summary and
conclusions.
I. Background
Money market deposit accounts were in part
a regulatory/legislative response to the success
of the money market funds (MMFs) which, by
late 1982, had attracted well over $240 billion,
much of it from traditional bank and thrift de-
positors. Money funds offered significant ad-
vantages over the regulated accounts offered by
depository institutions (hereafter referred to as
banks). First, the funds paid returns to inves-
tors near the wholesale money market rate.
Yields were determined by the return on the
funds' portfolios of short-term money market
instruments less a small administrative fee. Sec-
ond, the funds were generally liquid, allowing
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investors transaction and check-writing pnvI-
leges. These features were not available on
banks' "money market certificates", a six-
month time account with an indexed ceiling
rate that yielded only slightly less than a six-
month Treasury bill. Third, most funds' mini-
mum opening balance was well below the
$10,000 minimum required for banks' six-
month "money market certificates" or the
$20,000 minimum on 7- to 31-day time certifi-
cates. Fourth, the money funds were able to
raise "deposits" on a nationwide basis, effec-
tively skirting the prohibition that banks faced
on interstate deposit-taking. Finally, MMFscould be linked with other mutual funds and
security transactions.
Because of the money funds' dramatic
growth, there was considerable political pres-
sure to allow banks to offer comparable instru-
ments so that they could compete on an equal
footing. As it turned out, the MMDA and, to
a muchlesser extent, the Super-NOW accounts
were just such instruments. Without them (or
accounts similar to them), it appeared that de-
pository institutions might continue to lose re-
tail deposits to the money funds.
MMDA Terms
Although the MMDA was patterned after
the MMFs, there are some differences, primar-
ily regarding reserve requirements and regula-
tory limitations on transactions and minimum
balances. The MMDAs are free of interest rate
ceilings as long as a minimum balance of$1 ,000
is maintained ($2,500 prior to January 1, 1985),
and are insured to $100,000. The MMDA is
available to aU depositors, including individu-
als, governments, nonprofit institutions and
businesses-although non-personal deposits,
unlike personal deposits, are subject to a 3 per-
cent reserve requirement. In addition, unlike
the money funds, MMDAs have transaction
features that are restricted by regulation. De-
positors are allowed up to six automatic, tele-
phone or check transfers per month (with a
maximum of three check transactions), al-
though withdrawals made in person are unlim-
ited. (See Appendix Table 1 for a detailed de-
scription of the characteristics of MMDAs,
Super-NOWs and the money funds.)
Sources of MMDA Deposits
Where would the funds for the MMDA come
from? In general, funds would be expected to
come from other financial instruments that
were close substitutes (from both banks' and
depositors' perspectives) for regulated retail de-
posits. Since, at the time of the MMDA's intro-
duction, open-market interest rates had been
above the ceilings for a number of years, de-
positors who did not value the implicit interest
in terms of added services would already have
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moved their funds out of the low-paying retail
accounts. Thus, it seemed unlikely there would
be a further shift of funds out of low-interest
retail deposits, such as passbook savings, into
MMDAs.
Rather, the funds for MMDAs, which have
limited value as transaction accounts, would
come from those sources where depositors had
moved them in the first place, to avoid the ceil-
ings. We thus expected particularly large in-
flows into MMDAs from the money funds. De-
positors had shifted balances from regulated
retail accounts into the money funds apparently
because they viewed them as close substitutes.
Moreover, since banks had used large CDs to
replace lost retail deposits, we expected de-
clines in these balances as well. Also, to the
extent that the ceilings had induced depositors
to move funds into other near ceiling-free ac-
counts, such as the six-month money market
certificate, some of those funds probably also
would be moved into MMDAs.
By analyzing the decline in various types of
deposits that were contemporaneous with the
MMDA's initial rapid deposit growth, it is pos-
sible to infer which types ofdeposits were prob-
ably the most important sources of MMDA
funds. For banks and thrifts, aggregate deposit
data (at the national level) for small and large
time deposits, savings deposits and transaction
deposits are analyzed along with data on money
funds' assets. In Chart 1, these various deposit
stocks are plotted along with MMDA and
Super-NOW deposits to indicate which types of
deposits fell as MMDAs grew. Also, monthly
changes in various types of deposits were re-
gressed on monthly changes in MMDAs (and
other control variables) to provide quantitative
estimates of the sources of MMDA deposits.3
Chart 1 shows that a substantial decline in
the money market funds' assets coincided with
the growth in MMDAs, suggesting that the
money funds were substitutes for MMDAs and
thus an important source of MMDA deposits.
Similarly, our regression model shows a statisti-
cally significant decline of $.24 in money fund
assets for each dollar that flowed into MMDAs.
Although the data suggest that the moneyChart 1
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8funds were an important source of MMDA de-
posits, the money attracted from the MMFs did
not lead to a comparable increase in the total
deposits of the banking sector. As Chart 1
shows, there was only a slight increase in total
deposits after December 14, 1982 despite the
influx of funds into MMDAs from the money
funds. Thus, the MMDA inflows must have
been mostly offset by outflowsfrom other types
of deposits. In particular, we would expect
some of the funds in banks' large CDs to leave
the banking sector as money funds' assets ran
off. In part, this is because of the direct effect
of a reduction in the money funds' holdings of
banks' CDs as the money funds contracted.
Moreover, as banks experienced rapid inflows
into MMDAs, they would reduce their pur-
chases of relatively more expensive CDs, and
some of the previous holders of large CDs
would move their funds out of banking depos-
its. We find that there was indeed a statistically
significant decline in large time deposits (CDs)
of $.42 for each dollar increase in MMDAs.
This drop was considerably larger than the de-
cline in the money funds' assets.
This rather massive substitution of retail
MMDAs for wholesale CDs has important im-
plications for bank costs. Since MMDAs, like
other retail deposits, are generally less costly
than large CDs, this shift alone lowered banks'
deposit interest costs. The inflow from money
funds also has implications for their long-run
viability. Although we estimate that MMDAs
attracted nearly $90 billion from the money
funds, this appears to have been a one-time
shift since the money funds have continued to
grow despite competition from the MMDA. In-
deed, MMF assets have rebounded to near their
pre-MMDA peak.
There was also a dramatic, statistically sig-
nificant decline of $.52 in small-denomination
(less than $100,000) time deposits for each dol-
larincrease in MMDAs. After an actual decline
of nearly $150 billion over a six-month period,
small time deposits resumed their trend growth
rate as the growth in MMDAs tapered off. This
pattern suggests that there was a one-time shift
of funds. The largest decline in the small time
category took place in the popular six-month
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money market certificate, which already paid a
near (wholesale) market rate of interest, but
tied funds up for six months.
The impact of the switch from small time ac-
counts to MMDAs on the cost of funds was
probably Il()tt()() large for many institutions.
Nearly all of the funds in the small-time cate-
gory were already paying near open-market
rates or were tied to those rates by the end of
1982. Still, even though this switch did not di-
rectly alter the cost ofthese funds substantially,
it changed the overall composition of deposits
and shortened the (stated) maturity distribution
for retail deposits.
Both savings (passbook accounts, at the time
paying 5% percent at banks and 51/2 percent at
thrifts) and transactions balances-including
demand deposits, Negotiable Orders of With-
drawal (NOW) and Automatic Transfer Service
(ATS) accounts, and savings deposits author-
ized for telephone and preauthorized transfers,
but excluding Super-NOWs-also appeared to
fall slightly during the months following the au-
thorization of the MMDA. However, the
regression analysis does not provide evidence
of a statistically significant shift. It is likely that
the declines did not represent actual shifts be-
cause of build-ups (evident in Chart 1) in both
savings and transactions balances in the weeks
preceding the authorization of the MMDA.
Knowing that banks would be authorized to of-
fer these short-term market rate accounts as of
December 14, many depositors with maturing
instruments likely held funds temporarily in
transaction or savings accounts until the new
accounts were available.
The lack of a significant shift from savings
accounts into MMDAs suggests that (passbook)
savings accounts must be offering a large ser-
vice benefit that offsets the binding effect ofthe
interest ceiling. (The effect of binding interest
ceilings is discussed in the Box.) This confirms
our hypothesis that the gradual erosion ofthese
accounts had left mainly depositors that prefer
implicit interest in the form of non-taxable ser-
vices rather than taxable interest. Our findings
are consistent with evidence provided by Fur-
long (1984) that savings accounts-through10Figure 1
Tradeoff Between Services and Interest Needed
to Attract a Given Quantity of Deposits
Interest Payments
Added Cost of a Given Quantity
of Deposits Due to Interest Ceiling
R1--------"-.
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Combination of Interest and
Services Needed to Attract
Qo Deposits
Services, Measured in the Dollar
Cost of Providing Themhigh turnover-provide a substantial transac-
tion service component different from that of-
fered with MMDAs. Thus, the nearly $290 bil-
lion in savings deposits currently on the books
are not likely to be shifted suddenly out of sav-
ings in response to higher returns on MMDAs.
Surveys ofthe sources ofMMDAs made dur-
ing the rapid growth period provide results sim-
ilar to those discussed above, although most in-
dicate a higher proportion of new funds.
4 As
previously discussed, ourevidence suggests that
although a significant fraction of MMDA de-
posits were attracted from the money funds,
these inflows were offset by outflows from
other deposits. Although MMDAs apparently
had only a minor impact on total deposit
growth, they significantly altered institutions'
mix of deposits-increasing retail deposits at
the expense of wholesale deposits-and they
were successful in allowing banks to compete
with the money market funds for retail
deposits.
Adju.stment Costs
As Flannery (1982) and others have shown,
the existence of bank-specific transaction and
information costs mean that retail deposits have
a specific capital component making them a
"quasi-fixed" factor of production.8 That is, re-
tail deposits are somewhat like specific human
capital in that the transaction and informational
costsinvolved in opening an account are largely
specific to the bank in question. For example,
a consumer must invest time to learn about a
bank's rate, location and procedures, and must
fill out various forms to open an account. Most
ofthis investment, however, becomes worthless
if the consumer switches to another bank or
investment alternative.
As Becker (1962, 1964) has shown in the hu-
man capital context, the cost of specific invest-
ments will be shared. Ifbanks paid the full costs
II. Market Adjustment
MMDAs' very rapid acceptance by the mar-
ketplace confirms that there were substantial
cost savings for banks in offering such accounts
and that depositors preferred the combination
of explicit interest, maturity and services of-
fered by MMDAs to those available on at least
some pre-existing accounts. However, because
both banks and depositors would probably ex-
perience adjustment costs associated with open-
ing such accounts and shifting funds into them,
the adjustment of actual to desired stocks of
funds in these accounts would not be instanta-
neous. These adjustment costs have a number
of important implications discussed below.
Banks' Demand for MMDAs
Interest ceilings had led banks that were in
competitive markets to substitute nonpriced
services for interest payments and wholesale
deposits for retail deposits. By allowing banks
to attract funds directly through price compe-
tition, MMDAs were a lower cost means of at-
tracting funds than had existed previously.s
(See Box.) This regulatory innovation lowered
the average and marginal costs6 of attracting
deposits and simultaneously increased the ef-
fective rate paid to depositors, and thereby pro-
vided a strong incentive for banks to attract
funds into these accounts as well as a strong
incentive for depositors to shift funds into these
accounts.7
In theory, the growth of funds in MMDAs
would be determined jointly by households'
and banks' portfolio decisions. Banks, within
the limits imposed by competition, would set
the rates (and other terms) on these accounts,
and consumers could reallocate their portfolios
in response to those rates subject only to the
costs of such reallocations. Banks, of course,
might try to take into account households' re-
sponsiveness to interest rates when setting
rates, but households' reallocations might also
depend on their expectations about how banks
would price these accounts in the future. Fur-
thermore, information and other unique trans-
action costs associated with moving funds into
MMDAs might significantly affect the flow of
MMDA funds.
12(and received the returns) of the specific in-
vestment associated with opening accounts (by
compensating depositors for the time and
money costs of opening accounts), customers
could.switch accounts with no cost to them-
selves and therefore would not take into ac-
count these bank-specific investment costs.
Banks, in turn, would earn no return on their
investment in set-up expenses. Conversely, if
depositors bore the entire (time and money)
cost ofsetting up an account, banks could lower
the rates paid without taking into account the
lost investment the depositor would incur in
switching accounts. The theory of specific cap-
ital investment predicts, therefore, that the
costs of specific capital investments will be
shared by both parties so that they both at least
partially take into account the effects of their
behavior on these specific investments. Thus,
when an investment has a strong specific capital
component, as does opening an MMDA ac-
count, the trading parties share the costs of the
specific investment. This sharing, in turn, pro-
vides both parties with an incentive to continue
their relationship to protect their investment.
These shared costs ofsetting up new accounts
mean that both banks and depositors face ad-
justment costs when shifting deposits into
MMDAs. For example, if a bank wishes to at-
tract more deposits (at least partially through
deposits into new accounts), it must bear part
of the initial set-up costs as well as pay explicit
interest. Depositors also bear part of the initial
set-up costs. Adjustment costs for depositors
lead to differences in the short- and long-run
interest elasticities of the supply of deposits to
banks, and imply it takes time for actual stocks
to adjust to changes in desired deposit stocks.
Similarly, adjustment costsfor banks imply dif-
ferences in bank's short-run and long-run in-
terest elasticities of the demand for deposits.
As Flannery (1982) points out, these adjust-
ment costs can lead banks to pay rates of inter-
est on deposits in excess of their marginal rev-
enue products in the short-run when demand
temporarily declines, and to pay less than the
marginal revenue products when demand tem-
13
porarily increases, in order to minimize adjust-
ment costs. Over along-run period, however,
deposit costs are equated (on average) to mar-
ginal revenue products. Flannery also notes
thatifnon:retail deposits, such.as CDs, have
no or very small specific capital costs, then
banks will use these instruments to meet tem-
porary fluctuations in demand. Thus, it will be
occasionally worthwhilefor banks to pay higher
rates on retaildeposits than on wholesale funds
such as large denomination CDs to avoid the
adjustment costs associated with changing the
level of retail deposits.
Adjustment costs are likely to be important
for all types of retail deposits regardless of
whether they are newly authorized accounts.
However, unlike existing accounts in which one
can simply deposit a check, virtually all MMDA
deposits in the first few months were new de-
posits with the associated bank-specific set-up
costs. Because of this, banks could partly com-
pensate depositors for the costs of opening a
new account by paying high interest rates ini-
tially. However, for a short-term account like
the MMDA, this strategy is not cost-effective
once a substantial number of new accounts are
opened since high rates would have to be paid
to both new and existing accounts. Thus, one
strategy for banks would be to pay high rates
initially to partly compensate depositors for the
initial bank-specific set-up costs, but to com-
pensate depositors in some other way for the
costs of opening a new account once the rate
of new account formation slowed.
This specific-capital theory of retail deposit
flows implies that the cost and quantities of
such deposits will respond sluggishly or incom-
pletely to changes in wholesale market interest
rates. As Flannery and James (1984) point out,
this means that the effective maturity of a
bank's retail liabilities need not equal their
stated maturity (or time to repricing). Thus,
retail deposits will not be supplied perfectly
elastically, and the short-run interest elasticity
of the supply of deposits to banks will be con-
si<ierably less than the long-run elasticity.The Market Acceptance of MMDAs
When a new cost-saving technology such as
the MMDA is introduced, the adoption ofthat
technology is not instantaneous because there
are•costs ill leamillg.aboutthe technology as
well as costs involved in actually adopting the
new technology. The rate at which a new tech-
nology is adopted depends on the cost-savings
it affords compared to the information and
other adjustment costs ofadopting it. Although
it appeared to take MMDA deposits 3 to 4
months to reach an equilibrium (see Chart 1),
approximately 80 percent of banks nationwide
offered MMDA accounts starting on December
14, when they were first authorized (and which
was only two months after the enabling Garn-
St Germain Act was passed). Thus, the costs
associated with offering them must have been
greatly exceeded by the expected returns. How-
ever, the costs associated with opening. an
MMDA account must have been significant
since it took at least three months for deposits
to reach an "equilibrium" level.
Banks apparently expected substantial long-
run cost savings by attracting funds into
MMDAs because many institutions waged ag-
gressive promotional campaigns. Many devel-
oped concerted marketing efforts to attract
funds via television, radio and print media and
direct mail. Institutions also employed bonuses
Chart 2
















14for depositors opening new accounts (an incen-
tive to move funds between institutions) and,
perhaps most importantly, many offered pre-
mium interest rates considerably above money
market.fund •. yields .••.This•pricing .•behavior is
consistent with the specific capital model which
predicts that the specific capital investment re-
quired to open a new account will be shared by
banks through high initial direct interest pay-
ments, through cash bonuses for opening ac-
counts, or both.
InChart 2, we plot the average rate paid on
MMDAs (in our sample of western banks) and
money funds from the end of 1982 to the end
of 1984. This chart shows that the rates paid on
MMDAs were considerably higher than the
money fund rate in December 1982 and Janu-
ary 1983, but that the rates were close by March
of 1983. This is the exact pattern-high initial
rates followed by declines~predicted by the
specific capital because high interest
rates cannot continue to be used to partly com-
pensate depositors for the cost of opening new
accounts once a substantial number of new ac-
counts have been opened. AfterMay 1983,the
rate on the money funds exceeded that on
MMDAs and was considerably more variable.
This pattern.also is consistent with the specific
capitalmodel which predicts that rates on retail
accounts will behave more sluggishly than
wholesale rates. Also, since MMDAs offer both
federal deposit insurance (not available on
MMFs) and more convenience features (for ex-
ample, .access through automated teller ma-
chines) than money funds, we would expect
MMDA rates generally to be lower than money
fund rates except during periods when interest
rates temporarily decline.
III. Competition for MMDAs
In this section, we analyze the competition
among banks for MMDAs. Two broad issues
are considered: the determinants of banks' ini-
tial patterns of adopting MMDAs and the in-
terest-sensitivity of MMDA deposits. To ana-
lyze differences in banks' patterns of adoption
of MMDAs, we employ a logistic model of the
percent of each bank's total deposits in
MMDAs as a function of time. Differences in
the banks' parameters of the logistic are then
modeled as functions of various bank charac-
teristics and pricing strategies. To analyze the
interest-sensitivity of MMDAs, a standard
stock adjustment model of MMDA deposits is
employed. Short-run and long-run, own- and
cross-interest elasticities of the supply of
MMDA deposits to banks are estimated.
The Pattern of Adoption of MMDAs
As theory suggests, different banks would
adopt different strategies to attract MMDA de-
posits depending on the expected benefits and
costs. Those banks (and depositors) in the most
competitive deposit markets would have the
greatest incentives to switch to MMDAs be-
cause these banks would have experienced the
15
greatest added costs in attracting deposits due
to the inefficiencies of non-price competition.
They would have, in effect, been paying high
rates of interest (explicit plus implicit) on de-
posits while depositors were receiving low rates
because depositors valued the "free" services
and convenience at less than their cost. Simi-
larly, banks that had substituted wholesale de-
posits for retail deposits might have different
incentives to shift to MMDA funding than
banks that had substituted nonprice competi-
tion for price competition. Also, banks may be
in different loan markets and thus have differ-
ent demands for deposits. Finally, banks may
be in different markets for other factor inputs,
such as labor and real capital, and thus face
different prices for other factors of production.
These different input prices also would lead to
different demands for MMDAs.
To determine whether banks did differ in
their strategies to attract MMDAs and what ef-
fects these strategies had on the time-pattern of
adoption of MMDAs, we employed an empir-
icalstrategy first suggested by Griliches (1957)
for analyzing the adoption of new technologies.
If, in fact, the costs and benefits of attractingb the rate of growth of the percent of
deposits in MMDAs
a a parameter that positions the lo-
gistic on the time scale.
The logistiC functiol1, equatio111, is estimated
for each of the 59 banks in our sample using
the first 12 months of data on deposits. The
method ofestimation is non-linear least squares
(with Gauss-Newton iterative optimization)
that enables us to estimate the parameters K,
a and b simultaneously. Fits are generally ex-
cellent with over 99 percent ofthe variance ex-
plained by the model, and asymptotic t-values
of all parameters significant at the 1 percent
level or better.
Parameter estimatesfor a, band K (available
on request) show considerable variation across
banks in the time-pattern of adoption of
MMDAs. In Table 1, summary statistics for
these parameters of the logistic are presented.
Comparing the minimum to the maximum, the
parameter a varies by over 2 months; the rate
of growth parameter b also varies by a factor
of 3; and the equilibrium percentage of
MMDAs, the parameter K, varies from as low
as 7 percent to as high as 35 percent. This wide
variation indicates that banks did in fact expe-
rience different time-patterns in the adoption
ofMMDAs.
These results also can be used to compute the
time required for MMDAs to reach 90 percent
of their equilibrium value by applying the fol-
lowing formula.
(1)
the percentage of deposits at time t
in MMDAs
the equilibrium percentage of





MMDAs differ among banks, then we should
expect differences among banks in the time-
pattern of adoption of MMDAs. For banks in
the aggregate, there was anS-shaped pattern
of adoption (See Chart 1) ..Although we ",ould
expect individual banks to have the same gen-
eral S-shaped pattern of adoption of MMDAs,
the parameters of this function are expected to
differ among banks because of differing costs
and benefits to them of attracting MMDA
deposits.
To determine empirically whether the param-
eters of this general function do differ among
banks, we fit separate logistic functions to each
bank's percentage of total deposits in MMDAs
over time. The logistic is an S-shaped function
that captures the evolution over time in the
share oftotal deposits in MMDAs in each bank.
If the parameters of the logistic-which deter-
mine its origin, rate of growth and equilibrium
percentage-differ substantially across banks,
they then can be analyzed as functions of the
banks' strategies for attracting deposits to de-
termine how various strategies affected banks'
time-pattern of adoption of MMDAs.




Summary Statistics for the Variation in the Logistic Parameters Across Banks
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16T*90% = lib {log [P/(K-P)] - a} (2)
where: P/K = .90
This formula indicates that, for the "average
bartk"irt()\.l.l'.sample,.MMDA depositsl'eacned
90 percent oftheir equilibrium level in only 2.7
months, a very rapid rate of adjustment.
To test whether these observed differences in
banks'time-pattern ofadoption ofMMDAs can
be explained by differences in banks' strategies,
three regressions are performed with parame-
ters ofthe logistic as the dependent variables.
A common set ofeconomic variables, including
banks' pricing strategies and other variables in-
tended to capture some of the differences in
banks' behavior in attracting MMDA deposits,
are the independent variables.
In all three regressions, we allow for param-
eter differences among the states (in the
Twelfth District) by including state dummy
variables because banks in different states are
likely to be in different deposit and loan mar-
kets. We also control for total deposit growth
during the year prior to the introduction of
MMDAs because it seems likely that banks pre-
viously experiencing rapid deposit growth also
would experience more rapid MMDA growth.
Control variables for the absolute size of the
bank, in terms of total deposits in November
1982, the number of branches, and a dummy if
the bank has 5 or fewer branches, are also in-
cluded· to capture differences in the nonprice
component of payment. The key economic in-
dependentvariables are the average ofthe rates
offered inthe last weeks ofDecember 1982 and
January 1983-the average of the initial pro-
motional rates-and the average rate paid dur-
ing the last weeks of the next 10 months. We
expect that banks offering high initial rates
would have more rapid initial deposit growth
butthat the equilibrium percentage of deposits
would ..depend more strongly on the average
rate paid over time.
In column 1 of Table 2, we find that banks
with more rapid previous total deposit growth
also had more rapid MMDA growth, and that
the size of the bank in terms of total deposits
in November 1982 is also positively related to
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the growth rate of MMDAs. Banks with more
branclles experienced less rapid growth of
MMDAsperhaps because their greater conve-
nience made them less constrained by interest
ceilings and thus less willing to promote
MMDAs.Asexpected, high initial rates.on
MMDAs did lead to more rapid growth ofthese
accounts, but the average rate paid did not af-
fect growth.
In column 2 of Table 2, the equilibrium per-
centageofMMDAs is analyzed in terms of the
same independent variables. Both Idaho and
Utah had significantly smaller percentages of
deposits in MMDAs than California. We find
that the equilibrium percent of MMDA depos-
its depends on the mean rate paid over the en-
tire period but not on the initial rates paid in
December and January. We also find that banks
with a strong wholesale presence initially, mea-
sured by the percent of large CDs in total de-
posits, attracted fewer MMDAs. This might
have been expected since banks that focused on
wholesale markets probably would be less likely
to seek retail deposits.
Finally, in column 3 of Table 2 we analyze
the parameter ofthe logistic that shifts the func-
tion horizontally. An increase in this parameter
shifts the logistic to the left (and a decrease to
the right) indicating an earlier start to whatever
pattern of adoption was followed. Banks with
more branches did adopt MMDAs earlier. Not
too surprisingly, neither the initial nor longer
term MMDA rate have a significant effect on
when banks adopted the new account.
In sum, this analysis indicates that the ad-
justment of the market to MMDAs, while
rapid, was not instantaneous. This result is con-
sistent with the presence of adjustment costs
and differences between short- and long-run in-
terest rate elasticities. Banks that offered
higher initial rates attracted MMDAs more rap-
idly, but the ultimate percentage of their de-
posits consisting of MMDAs depended on the
average rate paid over a longer period of time.
Although this cross-sectional analysis of
MMDA deposits does suggest that banks
adopted different strategies for attracting de-
posits and experienced different patterns of ac-
ceptance of MMDAs, it does not provide esti-TABLE 2
Effects of Economic Variables on the Parameters of the Logistic
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***Significant at the 1% level
**Significant at the 5% level
'Significant at the lO% level
18This model has four important features.
First, as equation 7 indicates, the coefficient of
InQil-l is an estimate of I-A. Also, the coeffi-
cients of the interest rate variables are short-
we assume that the public's supply function of
deposits is stable compared to individual banks'
demand for deposits, so that the observed var-
iation in interest rates is exogenous. For vari-
ation in rates over time, this would seem to be
agoodaSSllmptioIl, bllt as the preceding anal-
ysis suggests, there is also substantial exoge-
nous cross-sectional variation in banks' strate-
gies for attracting MMDAs.
Our empirical version of equation 6, which
represents the supply of MMDA deposits to
banks, is as follows:
Ln(Qil) = a + 131 Ln(Qil_l) (7)
+ 132 Ln(Ri, MMDAI) + 133 Ln(RMMFt)
+ 134 CONTROLi + eit
where:
mates ofthe short- or long-run cross elasticities
with respect to rates oncompetitive assets (such
as the rateon money funds), nordoes it provide
estimates ofthe short- or long-run own interest
elasticities of MMDA deposits after the initial
adjiistmerifoccurred. To address theseqties~
tions, we estimate a stock-adjustment model of
the supply ofMMDAs to banks by pooling data
on our cross-section of banks over time.
A Stock-Adjustment Model of MMDA
Deposits
Portfolio theory suggests that the desired
stock of a particular asset (MMDA deposits
held by households and businesses), Af, will be
positively related to its own rate of return and
negatively related to the rates of return on sub-
stitute assets. Thus,
Af f(rlh,· .. , rj, ... , rn> W), (3)
where:
Af desired holdings of asset i
W wealth
ri expected rate of return on other
assets, i.
Because adjustment of actual asset stocks to
changes in desired asset stocks is costly, only a
fraction of the difference between desired and
actual asset stocks will be eliminated each pe-
riod. lO Thus, the actual asset stock of MMDAs
will behave as follows:
LlAil= Ail - Ail-l =A (Afl - Ail-I) (4)
where Ais the fraction of adjustment per unit
of time of the gap between the desired and ac-
tual value of the stock. Rewriting equation (4)
gives:
Ail = AAfl + Ail-l (1 - A) (5)
And substituting equation (3) gives:
Ail = (1 - A) Ail-l + Af (rl,... , rn, W). (6)
In this model, 8f/8ri is the long-run effect of a
change in ri on the (desired) asset stock (which
equals the actual asset stock in the long-run),
whereas A8f/8ri is the short-run, one-period
effect.
In estimating this stock-adjustment model,
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CONTROL =
The quantity (stock) of
MMDA deposits at bank i in
month 1.
the lagged quantity of
MMDA deposits.
the rate bank i pays on
MMDA deposits in month 1.
the average rate on money
market funds during month
1.
a vector of control variables
including: the natural log of
total deposits in November
1982, the growth of deposits
from November 1981 to No-
vember 1982, the percentage
of CDs in total deposits .in
November 1982, the natural
log of the number of
branches, a dummy for 5 or
fewer branches, and dum-
mies for each state in the
Twelfth Federal Reserve
District with California
being the excluded category
a random error term
parameters to be estimated.run elasticities (one-period elasticities), but the
long-run elasticities may be found by dividing
the coefficients by "-.
Second, in this model, data from individual
banks are pooled over time. This means that
theertbt term is likely to contain a bank-spe-
cific permanent component reflecting perma-
nent unmeasured characteristics of the bank.
As Balestra and Nerlove (1966) discuss, such a
permanent component can cause bias in models
like this one with lagged dependent variables
because the lagged dependent variable captures
the permanent component. To address this
problem, we include a variety of control vari-
ables including the size of the bank, both in
terms of deposits and branches in the month
prior to the introduction of MMDAs, the
growth of the bank during the year preceding
the introduction of MMDAs, the percent of
CDs in total deposits in the month prior to the
MMDA introduction (to proxy for the bank's
retail presence), and a set of state dummies to
capture remaining differences in the state mar-
ket and regulatory environment not captured
by the other variables. We hope that by includ-
ing these control variables most of any perma-
nent component of the error term will be elim-
inated. In addition, the effects of the control
variables are of interest in their own right.
Third, we apply this general model to three
different periods: the entire period, the initial
adjustment period following the introduction of
MMDAs, and the post-adjustment period.
These distinctions were made because the lo-
gistic analysis suggests that the flow of deposits
into MMDAs was much different during the
first three months after their introduction than
once they had reached an "equilibrium" level.
Thus, it is likely that both the own-and cross-
interest elasticity of supply of deposits, as well
as the speed of adjustment, would differ during
the adjustment and post-adjustment periods.
Finally, the functional form of the model is
log-log. This functional form has several advan-
tages when bank-level data are used. With this
form the coefficients of the interest rate vari-
ables can be directly interpreted as elasticities.
More importantly, since the banks in our sam-
ple vary widely in size (by several orders of
20
magnitude), the constant-elasticity functional
form is superior on a priori grounds to the lin-
ear form. This is because it is highly unlikely
that· a 1 percentage point increase in the
MMDA rate would have the same absolute ef-
fecfiouMMDAdeposits in a $20 billion dollar
bank as in a $20 million bank. By using the
constant elasticity, log-log functional form, in
which all analysis is in percentage terms, this
problem is avoided.
In Table 3, coefficient estimates ofthe model
described by equation 7 are presented. In the
first column, results are presentedfor the entire
period. The fit is very good and most coeffi-
cients are significant at the 1 percent level or
better. Generally, there are significant differ-
ences between several states and California in
the intercept of this model. These differences
suggest that MMDAs during the initial adjust-
ment period were more popular in California
than in Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah
(holding constant all other variables in the
model). This may be because the California
banking market is more competitive.
The results for the entire period (Column 1)
also suggest that the initial size of the bank (be-
fore MMDAs were offered) was an important
determinant of MMDAs, with an elasticity of
November 1982 total deposits of .30. That is,
banks with 1 percent greater total deposits at-
tracted .30 percent more MMDAs, all other
things equal. However, as the results in column
3 suggest, this effect of initial deposit size was
muchsmaller (about one-tenth as large) during
the post-adjustment period.
In December, banks with larger branch net-
works were more successful in attracting
MMDAs. However, there was not a significant
relationship between the number of branches
and MMDAs in either the post-adjustment or
adjustment periods.
Banks experiencing rapid growth in deposits
prior to the introduction of MMDAs also ap-
pearto have attracted more MMDAs (although
the result is not consistent across all time
frames). This result is not surprising since
banks situated in rapidly growing markets
might also experience more rapid MMDA
growth.TABLE 3
Analysis of the Quantity of MMDA Deposits at Banks Over Time
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Jclnuary '83 Janua.ry '83 Ma.rch '83 Decernber·'82
December '84 February '83 December '84
Number of observations 1416 118 1288 59
Standard error of .12 .15 .043 .48
R2 .996 .995 .9995 .96
----
Mean of dependent variable 11.83 11.56 11.86 10.48
Anti-log of mean ($1000s) $137,749 $104,820 $141,492 $35,596
Intercept - 4.81*** 396.06*** .08 -22.19**
(.41) (58.38) (. (9.76)
State dummies (California excluded)
Arizona .03*** .0038 .006 .58*
(.01) (.06) (.005) (.29)
Hawaii -.02 - .15** .001 -.085
(.02) (.06) (.006) (.30)
Idaho - .17**' - .22*" -.006 -.041
(.01) (.07) (.006) (.41)
Nevada - .10*'* - .37*** -.002 -.72
(.03) (.12) (.01) (.56)
Oregon - .05**' - .17*** .002 .62*
(.01) (.06) (.005) (.34)
Utah .24*** - .21*** -.01 .97***
(.01) (.07) (.006) (.30)
Washington - .07*** .14*** .0005 .11
(.01) (.05) (.004) (.26)
Ln (Nov. '82 Deposits) .30*** .38*** .03*** .56***
(.01) (.04) (.005) (.17)
~-~,~"-----~~~-"
Nov. '82 Deposits/Nov. '81 Deposits .15*** .033 .02* l.O87
(.03) (.16) (.01) (.71)
Large CDs/Total Deposits, Nov. '82 - .28*** .46*** .05*** .71
(.03) (.13) (.01) (.59)
Ln (Number of Branches) .04*** -.052 .0001 .52***
(.01) (.043) (.004) (.18)
----_.~-~-
1 if 5 or fewer branches .002 .08 .006 -.023
(.01) (.06) (.005) (.26)
Ln (Lagged MMDA quantity at Bank i) .67*** .65*** .97***
(.01) (.04) (.005)
"-"_._----,."---"-_.~._-----,,~---
Ln (Rate on MMDAs at bank i 1.56*** .08 .19*** 3.18**
at time t) (.08) (.28) (.04) (1.32)
Ln (Rate on MMFs at time t) - .86**' - .60*** - .21***
(.04) (.09) (.02)
-------_._--"'-_.-
21The coefficient of the lagged dependent vari-
able does suggest that adjustment is not instan-
taneous and hence not costless. However, dur-
ing the initial adjustment period (Column 2),
the. estimates suggest that an adjustment of
about 35 percent of the difference between ac-
tual and desired stocks occurred per month.
This result indicates that over 70 percent of the
adjustment to the new equilibrium occurred
within 3 months. This rate of adjustment is not
too different, although it is somewhat slower,
than that obtained from the logistic analysis.
However, during the post-adjustment period
(Column 3), adjustment is much more sluggish,
with an implied rate of only 3 percent per
month. This result also is consistent with the
notion that the costs ofsetting up new accounts
are much different than the costs of adjusting
deposit balances in existing accounts. In fact,
the bank-specific capital model predicts that
once new accounts are established, both banks
and consumers will behave in such a way as to
make relatively few adjustments in the quantity
of funds in the accounts. This would lead to
high serial correlation and a slow adjustment.
The own interest elasticity for the entire pe-
riod (Column 1) suggests that the accounts were
sensitive, at least in the long-run, to the rate
paid on them. For example, the short-run elas-
ticity was 1.56 and the long-run elasticity 4.73.
However, it should be noted that these are
firm-level elasticities that are expected to be
large in competitive markets.
During the post-adjustment period (Column
3), MMDAs were much less interest-sensitive,
with a statistically significant short-run own
elasticity ofabout .19. Also, during this period,
the estimated speed of adjustment was dramat-
ically less-only 3 percent per month. This re-
sult is not unexpected given the existence of
bank-specific capital costs. However, even dur-
ing this period, the long-run elasticity was ap-
proximately 6.33.
To see whether the high initial rates were suc-
cessful in attracting MMDAs, the model with-
out the lagged dependent variable (which is mi-
nus infinity) and the money fund rate (which is
constant in anyone month) is estimated for De::""
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cember (Column 4). The results suggest a very
high initial interest elasticity of over 3. That is,
banks with 1 percent higher MMDA rates at-
tracted over 3 percent more MMDA deposits
bythe end of December.
The results in Table 3 also suggest that money
funds provide important competition to
MMDAs. We find a statistically significant
shorHun cross elasticity of MMDAs with re-
spect to rates paid on money funds ofabout .21
(Column 3), confirming that these two accounts
are substitutes. This result is consistent with the
sizable initial runoff of money funds into
MMDAs.
The money fund rate in this model, however,
plays a dual role. Although it is a measure of
the return on an alternative substitute asset, it
is also a proxy for market rates in general.
Thus, we probably have overestimated the
cross elasticity of money funds with MMDAs
because a higher money fund rate may simply
indicate high MMDA rates being paid at other
banks. Attempts to measure the effects of both
the money fund rate and the average rate of
MMDAs proved unsuccessful, probably be-
cause of the high correlation and limited inde-
pendent variation in these two rates.
One of the major uncertainties surrounding
the introduction ofthe MMDA was its interest-
rate sensitivity. If MMDAs were very sensitive
to interest rates, banks could attract inflows
with marginally higher interest rates and
MMDAs would be a relatively unstable and
costly source offunds whose rate would behave
very much like rates on money funds, or other
wholesale market return instruments.
If, on the other hand, MMDAs were rela-
tively insensitive to interest rates, then deposits
would be less likely to shift from institution to
institution without large or permanent rate dif-
ferences. Thus, institutions potentially would
benefit by having a stable source ofretail funds
whose effective maturity exceeded its stated
maturity and whose cost varied much less than
wholesale deposits.
Although our results suggest that MMDAs
are quite interest-sensitive in the long-run, they
also support the notion that MMDAs are notvery interest-sensitive in the short-run. Thus,
MMDAs appear to behave more like retail de-
posits with a significant bank-specific capital
component than wholesale deposits such as
large CDs.
is not surprising since money funds had taken
numerous actions aimed at reducing potential
outflows. With the authorization of the
MMDA, many money funds lowered their min-
imums to well below the statutory MMDA min-
imum, and increased the services their products
provided, for example, by linking accounts to
brokerage services and providing easy access to
otherfunds (often called families offunds), and
by specializing in short-term investments in tax-
exempt securities, riskless securities or high
risk/high return securities. We also find in our
analysis of aggregate data that because the
MMDAs are not substitutes for transaction ac-
counts, there is little reason to expect them to
have affected the M1 measure of the money
stock.
The adoption of MMDAs was very rapid.
Most banks offered such accounts on the day
they were authorized and the quantity of funds
in these accounts reached over 90 percent of its
equilibrium value within 3 months. The rate of
adoption by depositors depended on the initial
promotional rates offered by banks whereas
each bank's equilibrium percentage of deposits
in MMDAs depended on the average rate paid
over a longer period of time.
Most banks paid very high initial rates on
MMDAs, but once the rate at which new ac-
counts formed declined, rates dropped below
the level offered by the money funds. This type
of pricing behavior is consistent with large
bank-specific set-up costs associated with open-
ing new accounts. Theory predicts that such
specific capital costs will be shared by banks
and their customers and high initial rates are
one way of doing this. In addition, the rates
paid on MMDAs have been less volatile and
generally below wholesale rates after the initial
adjustment period-a type of pricing behavior
also consistent with the specific capital model.
IV... Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, the competition for MMDA de-
posits-both interbank as well as with the
moneyfunds-is analyzed. The analysis focuses
on four areas: (1) the sources of the MMDA
deposits, (2) the pattern of adoption by banks
and the public of these new accounts, (3)· the
pricing of these accounts and (4) the interest-
sensitivity of these accounts in both the short-
and long-run and with respect to their own rate
as well as the rates on money fund assets. Sev-
eral findings emerged.
The MMDA deposits came primarily from
the money funds, small time deposits, and large
CDs. Although MMDAs attracted approxi-
mately $90 billion from the money funds, the
money funds have continued to prosper in the
face of competition from the MMDAs. The
MMDA did not, on average, appear to lead
banks to increase the overall quantity of their
liabilities substantially, but it did enable them
to increase substantially their quantity of retail
deposits thus reducing their dependence on
wholesale deposits (large CDs). To the extent
that banks' primary comparative advantage is
in providing intermediation services at the re-
tail level, the MMDA has enabled banks to
strengthen greatly their competitive position in
the retail deposit market. By reducing their re-
liance on purchased funds, it may actually have
improved their ability to borrow in the whole-
sale markets as well.
This suggests that banks' primary responses
to Regulation Q were to substitute wholesale
for retail deposits, and nonprice competition
for direct price competition in attracting funds
to these. accounts. Both responses apparently
increased banks' deposit costs.
The facts that the money funds lost only a
fraction of their deposits to the MMDAs and
that their cross elasticity was statistically signif-
icant but not too large suggest that the money
funds and MMDAs are substitutes, but not as
close substitutes as some had anticipated. This
23The speed with which MMDAs were adopted
suggests that depositors viewed them as being
superior to existing retail accounts, especially
small time accounts (from which a significant
fraction ofthe funds came). Thefact that banks
promoted these accounts so widely and paid
such high initial rates suggests that banks had
faced substantial costs in their nonprice com-
petition for retail accounts and in their substi-
tution of wholesale for retail accounts to miti-
gate the economic forces of disintermediation
due to Regulation Q.
The MMDAs were fairly interest-sensitive
(even in the short-run) during the initial pro-
motional period and this quality made the ini-
tial adjustment of actual to desired asset stock
levels rapid. However, once MMDAs reached
an equilibrium level, further adjustment was
much slower because of the existence of signif-
icant bank-specific capital costs. These costs
meant that, once accounts were opened, de-
posits would shift only slowly in response to
il1terbank interest differentials. This implies
that the effective maturity (or duration) of
MMDAs is considerably longer than their
stated maturity, or time to repricing.
Insum, MMDAs have been an important in-
novation in the retail banking market. They
have offered retail customers a more valuable
package of explicit compensation and implicit
services than had existed previously. On the
banking side, banks have been able to substi-
tute retail for wholesale deposits and price com-
petition for nonprice competition, thus securing
a more stable and lower cost source ofdeposits.
Data Appendix
Data analyzed in this study were collected by
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco's
Statistical and Data Services Department for
the Monthly Survey of Selected Deposits and
Other Accounts (FR 2042) and the Report of
Transaction Accounts, Other Deposits, and
Vault Cash (FR 2900) reports. The FR 2042
data are collected from a stratified sample (by
size) of sixty-four banks in the eight western
states. Total time deposits of these banks ac-
count for about eighty-two percent of the total
time deposits ofall insured banks in the Twelfth
District. Both outstanding dollar amounts as of
the last Wednesday of the month, and the most
common interest rate paid during the week
ending on the last Wednesday of the month, are
reported for a number of deposit categories,
including MMDAs, Super-NOWS and several
other time certificate categories. Additional de-
posit data for these banks were taken from the
daily FR 2900 report. In particular, total do-
mestic deposits, and total large denomination
24
time deposits were used as control variables in
the study.
Aggregated bank and thrift data for the na-
tion were provided by the Division ofResearch
and Statistics, Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System. Data were not seasonally
adjusted, and most are available from the
Board of Governors' H.6 press release entitled
Money Stock Measures. For our analysis, the
large time deposits series used was the gross
series, which includes money market fund and
thrift holdings of large certificate of deposits.
Additional information on money market
fund rates, and bank and thrift interest rates
were taken from Donoghue's Moneyletter and
the Bank Rate Monitor respectively.
Bank structure and branch measures are de-
rived from the annual Summary of Deposits
Survey taken by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and published yearly under the
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*At present only a few money market funds have private insurance coverage.
25FOOTNOTES
A $1.00 Change in MMDAs Has the Following Impact
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1. The Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee
(DIDC) created the Super-NOW account. This account,
which became available on January 5,1983, was a ceiling-
free checking account without limitations on transactions
intendedt6be cOI11J:>etitive withthernoney funds.
2. See Rosen and Katz (1983), Fortune (1975), King
(1984), and Garcia and McMahon (1984) for examples of
studies of aggregate deposits.
3. The regreSsion model controls for changes in Super-
NOWs, total liquid assets in the economy, a time trend, and
seasonal factors. The estimation period was from January
1979 to June 1983. The results from this regression are as
follows:
Dependent Variable
Change in Small Denomination Time
Deposits
Change in Large Denomination Time
Deposits
Change in Savings Deposits
Change in Transaction Deposits
Change in Total Deposits Except MMDA
and Super-NOW Deposits
Change in Total Deposits
Change in Money Market Mutual Fund
Assets
---~------
***Significant at the 1% level
**Significant at the 5% level
*Significant at the 10% level


















5. See Keeley (1984) and Keeley and Zimmerman (1984)
for a discussion of the effects of ceilings on deposit costs.
Also see Benston (1964), Startz (1983) and Rogowski
(1984).
6. It should be noted that these marginal and average (in-
terest plus non-interest) costs relate to a given maturity
deposit at a given point in time. That is, for a deposit of a
given maturity at a particular point in time, the elimination
of interest ceilings reduces its marginal and average costs.
This concept differs from that of differences in marginal
and average costs for long-term deposits at differentpoints
in time due to the possibility of attracting new Ipng.term
deposits at different rates than are being paid on existing
long-term deposits that had been acquired earlier.
7. This analysis along with the smaller market for unlimited
transaction accounts may explain why Super-NOWs were
much less popular than MMDAs. Since Super-NOWs were
close substitutes for existing checking and NOW acpounts
in terms of the services they provided and in terms of re-
serve requirements, one would expect Super-NOWs to
grow rapidly only if the interest ceilings on checking and
NOW accounts were binding. However, even with interest
ceilings, most banks imposed fees, at least for small de-
positors, on such accounts. Thus, for such small deposi-
tors, the ceilings were not binding. Only for largedeposi-
tors, for which the ceilings likely were binding, would there
be any gain for the banks and depositors in shifting to
Super-NOW accounts.
8. The concept of a quasi-fixed factor of production is due
to Oi (1962).
9. The logistic function is asymptotic to 0 and K and sym-
metric around the inflection point. Its first derivative with
respect to time is given by:
dP b K [K - P(t*}]
dtt=t, P(t*}
That is, the rate of growth of the logistic is inversely pro-
portional to the growth already achieved and directly pro-
portional to the distance from the ceiling.
In other words, ~--,-og [P/(~-P}] b .
dt
10. Griliches (1967) has shown that if the costs of adjust-
ment are a quadratic function of the amount of adjustment,
and if the costs of being out of equilibrium are also a quad-
ratic function of the amount one is out of equilibrium, only
a fraction of the difference between the desired and actual
stock will be eliminated each period.REFERENCES
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